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urope,  or more  precisely  the  eurozone, has  become  a  big  problem  for the  world  economy.  This has 
profound  implications  for  European  foreign  policy.  Foreign  ministers  may  turn  the  other  way,  with 
remarks  like  ‘not  our  fault’,  and  seek  to  get  on  with  their  business  of  making  a  better  world  with 
projection of European values into the international arena, no doubt stressing their continuing commitment to a 
normative multilateral order. 
But this approach does not fly. The immediate consequence of the eurozone crisis is the degradation of the 
reputation  of  the  European  Union  as  a  whole  on  two  accounts: as  a model  of  competent  economic  policy 
management  and  as  a  model  of  enlightened  regional  integration.  The  management  of  the  crisis  has  been 
collectively incompetent, and the eurozone’s governance structure has proved to be systemically flawed. This 
reputational degradation heightens resentment in the rest of the world at the overrepresentation of European 
states in the major multilateral organisations. 
None of this is just vague speculation, but concrete reality in three major institutions: the IMF, World Bank and 
UN Security Council. The voting weights in the IMF were last revised in 2010, with ratification still pending, 
and with further revisions normally due at five-year intervals. In 2010 Belgium and the Netherlands fought as 
their supreme national priority to retain their seats on the IMF Executive Board. They could only be pushed into 
giving some ground when the United States threatened to invoke a rule or procedure of the IMF, which meant 
that in the absence of agreement two states with the smallest quotas would be ejected from the Board, these two 
happening  to  be  India  and  Brazil  –  what  a  triumph  of  European  diplomacy  that  would  have  been.  While 
pretending in speeches to be the champions of a vigorous multilateral order, these Europeans were engaging in 
mere bureaucratic protectionism. 
The new IMF affair concerns the $460 billion firewall recently agreed to protect against contagion from the 
eurozone crisis. The new emerging world powers, notably the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), agreed to make major contributions, whereas the United States and Canada declined to make any. Upon 
making enquiries about the precise amounts of the contributions by the BRICS, we learned recently that at least 
some of them have so far declined to announce their offers until they first see progress on the revision of their 
voting weights.  The conditionality tables are turned. 
Now for the World Bank. The very recent election of a new President of US nationality, following the election of 
a  European to  the  IMF  in  2011, has renewed  resentment  over  the  continuation  of  this  Western  leadership 
preserve. The voting weights are such that if the old West votes together in mutual support, as they have just 
done in both cases, they cannot be outvoted by the rest of the world. But now the BRICS have begun to discuss 
the feasibility of setting up their own BRICS development bank, motivated at least in part by the slow and 
limited recognition by the West of their underrepresentation. The BRICS have ample capacity to do this on a 
grand scale. Brazil points out that its own development bank alone has a balance sheet twice that of the World 
Bank. Sidelining the World Bank would have major implications for the economic policy norms prevailing in 
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global  finance.  The Europeans, in particular,  supposedly  multilateralism’s  best  friend,  would  be  fostering a 
structural development at the level of global finance over which they would have no voice at all. Hanging on to 
overrepresentation for as long as possible as the highest national priority thus becomes counterproductive. 
Questions of reforming the UN Security Council have been debated for decades. The original P5 order (veto 
carrying permanent members: China, France, UK, US, and USSR succeeded by Russia), born of the outcome of 
the second world war 67 years ago, remains intact. France and the UK hold onto their P5 positions as diplomatic 
priorities. The claims of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India go on unanswered. Germany appreciates that its 
demand would only make the European overrepresentation worse, and has said it could agree to a seat for the EU 
instead, but France and the UK do not agree to this. 
What to do? Consolidated representation with a reduced weight compared to the total weights of EU member 
states is the logical solution, most clearly for the IMF and World Bank. At the IMF there should be a single seat 
and voting weight for the eurozone, assuming its leaders can soon summon up enough wisdom to resolve the 
crisis before it is too late. At the World Bank there should be a single seat for the EU, which is the largest aid 
donor globally, with the Commission’s programmes larger than any of the bilateral programmes of its member 
states. 
For the UN Security Council, population weights are arguably more relevant than economic weights. On this 
score there are now five states with populations of over 100 million (i.e. double or more France or the UK) 
without permanent representation on the Security Council: billionaire India here in a class of its own, followed 
by Indonesia, Brazil, Japan and Mexico.  In 2011, the EU secured improved status at the UN General Assembly, 
and at the UN Security Council the EU High Representative can be invited to speak on issues where there is an 
EU position. But this hardly solves the problem of reform demanded by the new major powers.   
For how much longer can the now 67-year-old legacy of World War II prevail? Conservatives in France and the 
UK, whose populations are not even in the top 10 of the G20, want to hold on to the status quo as long as 
possible. It will require a strong strategic argument to induce them to shift their position, not just some vague 
appeal to fairness based on population and economic data. In fact, one such argument becomes evident, with the 
rise of the BRICS as a group determined to achieve greater power in world affairs as their only common interest. 
The BRICS divide on many accounts, but the most salient here is that three of them style themselves as vibrant 
democracies (Brazil, India, South Africa, of ‘ISBA’ as a group), whereas two remain semi-authoritarian states 
(China,  Russia).  These  divergences  in  domestic  political  norms  spill  over  into  foreign  policy  norms.  The 
question of global strategic political significance is whether adherence to the kind of political norms favoured by 
Europe can become predominant, to the point of persuading China and Russia to come closer to a normative 
global consensus. This scenario will hang on whether the West can increasingly converge with the ISBAs with 
whom  it  has  much  political  ideology  in  common,  inter  alia  supporting  the  claims  of  India  and  Brazil  for 
permanent  Security  Council  membership;  or  whether  continued  European  conservatism  over  the  status  quo 
pushes the ISBAs into anti-Western positions with the other BRICS.   
The voices that simply lament Europe’s relative decline are overlooking the fact that the EU has in fact a huge 
opportunity, if only its institutions and member states can get round to exploiting it. Together the EU is number 
one in the world economy, and its population weight of 500 million puts in next in line after the two billionaires, 
China and India (see table below). The EU also has a clear doctrine in international relations, with its support for 
normatively ordered multilateralism. Salvation of the euro is going to require a federalistic strengthening of the 
economic competences at least of the eurozone, and probably in some degree for the EU as a whole. Europe’s 
foreign policy planners should be at work on how to follow this through synergetically with rationalisation and 
strengthening of the EU’s role as global actor. 
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G20, population and GDP  
    Population, 
(millions) 
    GDP 
($ billions) 
1  China  1,3991  EU  17,557
2  India  1,2102  US  15,098
3  EU  5013  China  7,298
4  US  3094  Japan  5,869
5  Indonesia  2375  Germany  3,557
6  Brazil  1936  France  2,776
7  Russia  1417  Brazil  2,492
8  Japan  1278  UK  2,417
9  Mexico  1129  Italy  2,198
10  Germany  8110  Russia  1,850
11  Turkey  7211  Canada  1,736
12  France  6512  India  1.676
13  UK  6213  Australia  1,488
14  Italy  6014  Mexico  1,154
15  South Africa  4915  South Korea  1,116
16  South Korea  4816  Indonesia  845
17  Argentina  4017  Turkey  778
18  Canada  3418  Saudi Arabia  577
19  Saudi Arabia  2719  Argentina  447
20  Australia  2220  South Africa  408
 